

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

8 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, OIR
Colonel B. B. Talley, C-2
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN
Captain R. G. McCool, JIC

SUBJECT : NIE-41: Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951

1. Suggested terms of reference for subject estimate, urgently requested by the Department of State, are enclosed for your consideration.
2. It is requested that your representative be prepared to meet in Room 146 South Building at 10:00 Friday, 10 August to discuss these terms, at which time production responsibilities will also be allocated.

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Executive Secretary

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
O F F I C E O F N A T I O N A L E S T I M A T E S

7 August 1951

S U B J E C T : T E R M S O F R E F E R E N C E : NIE-41: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
I N T H E KASHMIR D I S P U T E T O T H E E N D O F 1951
(For consideration by the IAC Representatives)

T H E P R O B L E M

To estimate Indian and Pakistani capabilities and intentions concerning Kashmir, with particular reference to the possible use of armed force during 1951.

Q U E S T I O N S B E A R I N G O N T H E P R O B L E M

I. W H A T I S T H E C U R R E N T S T A T U S O F K A S H M I R ?

Brief introductory section outlining the development of the dispute up through the designation of the Graham mission and the present upsurge of tension. It should note: (1) the military situation in Kashmir, including deployment of the respective forces; and (2) the position of the Abdulla and Azad Kashmir governments; and (3) the role of the UN and recent UN activity. Significant dates should be specified.

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II. WHY ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN KASHMIR?

A. What are the roots of Indian interest in Kashmir?

1. Nationalism (including religious, historical, and prestige factors) -- how important and enduring is this interest?
2. Economic: is Kashmir important to the Indian economy? How and to what degree? Could possession of Kashmir be used to bring economic pressure on Pakistan particularly through control of the water supply?
3. Military: what is the importance of Kashmir in relation to possible conflict with Pakistan? -- in relation to conflict with any other state? Do military leaders of India attach importance to Kashmir?
4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Indian domestic politics?
5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is there any particular urgency or a time factor attached to any one or to all?

B. What are the roots of Pakistani interest in Kashmir?

1. Nationalism (including religious, historical, and prestige factors) -- how important and enduring is this interest?

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2. Economic: Is Kashmir important to the Pakistani economy? How and to what degree?
3. Military: What is the importance of Kashmir in relation to possible conflict with India? -- in relation to conflict with any other state? Do military leaders of Pakistan attach importance to Kashmir?
4. What is the relation of the Kashmir issue to Pakistani domestic politics?
5. What is the relative weight of these factors? Is there any particular urgency or a time factor attached to any one or to all?
- C. Could these interests in Kashmir be satisfied for either nation by anything short of total control of Kashmir? If so, to what extent? How geographically?

III. WHAT ARE INDIA'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

- A. What are India's military capabilities in relation to: (1) all-out war against Pakistan; (2) limited action designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any invasion of present Pakistan or with only limited invasion. To what extent might India be aided or hindered by Afghan intervention in a conflict?

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B. What are India's political capabilities:

1. Through continued cooperation with Abdulla, including such projects as the approaching Constituent Assembly elections? What are the likely results of these elections and what consequences would follow from these results?
2. Through UN action? Would Indian leaders believe there was a possibility of a favorable turn in the UN?
3. Through collusion with Afghanistan? Could the Indian leaders hope to use this to hamstring the Pakistani and continue the present status quo?

C. What intentions are indicated by recent Indian activities?

Do Indian military moves and political statements indicate a desire to provoke war, a willingness to accept war, or the pursuit of political objectives through military pressure?

1. Is there any direct evidence of the purpose of recent Indian activities?
2. Do Indian military moves constitute a complete preparation for either a limited or all-out war? Would additional moves be necessary or likely before either could be undertaken?

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3. Are there any special time or weather factors limiting Indian freedom of action?
4. What possible non-military object could the recent moves have?

D. What are the pros and cons of a deliberate resort to war by India?

1. Possible Pros:
 - a. Do the Indians believe that they might achieve a fairly easy victory which would cement their position in Kashmir and at the same time secure the border and release their forces?
 - b. Do the Indians believe that nothing short of military force will achieve a lasting solution satisfactory to their interests, and that they cannot expect such a solution from political measures?
 - c. Would a campaign against Pakistan, limited or all-out, have domestic political advantages for Nehru?

2. Possible Cons:

- a. Do the Indians regard the present status quo in Pakistan as satisfactory without the need for further action?

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- b. Are the Indians uncertain of a quick and easy victory? If so, to what extent may they be deterred by possible destruction, cost, and economic burdens of a prolonged struggle?
- c. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of renewed communal rioting within India as a result of war?
- d. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect of Pakistani reaction elsewhere, such as expulsion of Hindus from Bengal or adverse trade measures?
- e. Are the Indians deterred by possible adverse reaction: (a) in the UN; (b) in Asia, (Burma, Indonesia, etc.); (c) in the Arab world (affecting Iranian oil for example); (d) in the British Commonwealth nations, affecting India's ties in this quarter?
- f. Are the Indians deterred by any prospect that an armed conflict would greatly weaken the overall strength of the area in the face of the Soviet threat?

3. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate resort to war by India likely?

E. Assuming a deliberate resort to war is unlikely, might the Indian government be driven to war by popular clamor or by increased communal rioting and feeling within India? What are the prospects of such clamor and increased rioting? Is there any evidence of Communist activity designed to promote them (cf. the Tudeh party in Iran)?

F. If war is avoided, or as an accompaniment to limited military action, what non-military courses of action are the Indians likely to follow? What are the chances of increased cooperation with and promotion of the Abdulla regime? Of increased collusion with Afghanistan? Of any other new courses of action? Finally, what are the chances of Indian acquiescence in UN action?

IV. WHAT ARE PAKISTAN'S CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS?

A. What are Pakistan's military capabilities in relation to: (1) all-out war against India; (2) limited action designed to secure all or a part of Kashmir without any invasion of present India or with only limited such invasion? To what extent might Pakistan be aided or hindered by Afghan intervention in a conflict?

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B. What are Pakistan's political capabilities:

1. Through the UN? Are the Pakistani leaders confident of a favorable solution through the UN?
2. Through enlistment of British Commonwealth or other support?

C. What are the indications from the Pakistani response to India's activities?

1. Do Pakistani military moves indicate a state of complete readiness for war? Do troop dispositions indicate the possibility of action elsewhere than in Kashmir itself?
2. Have Pakistani political statements been conciliatory or do they indicate a possible desire to put India in the wrong and accept war?

D. What are the pros and cons of a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan?

1. Possible pros:
 - a. Do the Pakistani leaders regard the present Kashmir situation as intolerable and any favorable UN solution as so remote or impossible as to be not worth waiting for?

b. Do the Pakistani leaders believe that, whatever their prospects in an all-out war, they might be able to achieve initial successes and then dig in and possibly accept a UN cease-fire?

c. How strong are the domestic political pressures for war?

2. Possible Cons:

a. Do the Pakistani leaders fear that a war would become one of attrition with heavy casualties and other burdens?

b. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by the exposed position of East Pakistan? Could this area be defended in case of war?

c. Do the Pakistani leaders fear attack from Afghanistan in the event of war with India? Or, on the contrary, might the Pakistani leaders expect that in the event of war with India the Pathan tribes might join with Pakistan and against Afghanistan, to Pakistan's long-term advantage?

d. Are the Pakistani sensitive to the fact that conflict would weaken the area in face of a Soviet threat?

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e. Are the Pakistani leaders deterred by possible adverse world and British Commonwealth opinion?

3. Do the cons outweigh the pros? Is a deliberate resort to war by Pakistan likely?

E. Assuming a deliberate resort to war is unlikely, might the Pakistan government be driven to war by popular clamor, by border incidents, or even by the Pakistani army itself getting out of control and taking unauthorized hostile action? What are the chances of such events? Is there any evidence of Communist activity designed to promote them?

F. If war is avoided, or as an accompaniment to limited military action, what non-military courses of action are the Pakistani likely to follow? What moves might Pakistan make in the UN? Might Pakistan seek some other solution, such as a resort to arbitration or the International Court of Justice?

V. WHAT ARE UN CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS?

What are the likely results of the Graham mission?

What other action might the UN take, either at the instigation of one of the parties or of some third nation? What concrete action might the UN take in implementing any resolution?

VI. WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

How might either India or Pakistan react to possible moves by the other or by the UN? What are the chances of a series of actions, individually less than a provocation to war, creating a situation in which war would become more likely? How might this happen?

Conversely, what are the chances of a relaxation of tension? How might this happen?